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ABSTRACT 
The author began the paper with a brief historical perspective of financial development and economic 
growth  in  general  and  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  in  particular.  He  then  presented  the  methodology 
employed during the research. This was followed by the review of the literature.  Next the researcher 
outlined his findings preceded by analysis and policy implications for decision-makers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The writer ended the paper with some policy recommendations to accelerate the development 
of the financial sector and spur economic growth and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Historical  Perspective  on  Financial  Development  and  Economic  Growth:    A  growing  volume  of 
theoretical and empirical work shows that the development of institutions and financial markets are 
vital to economic growth (Levine, 2003).  The relationship between financial development and economic 
growth  is  a  long-debated  issue  among  economists.    Building  on  the  works  by  Bagehot  (1873), 
Schumpeter (1934), Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon (1973), recent research 
(Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004; Levine, 2003; and Beck, 2006) has employed cross-country, panel, 
industry-level, firm-level, and case study analyses to demonstrate that financial development promotes 
long-term economic growth. Some studies go as far as to suggest that developed financial markets are 
essential for long-term growth (Acemoglu et al., 2004).  Hence, a developed and sound financial sector 
results not only in the availability of financial services, but also contributes to growth.  Gelbard and 
Pereira  Leite  (1999)  empirically  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  strong  positive  relationship  between 
financial depth and growth in SSA. 
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Financial sector and economic development are of particular importance for SSA economies.  Collier 
(2006) argues that SSA currently faces its best opportunity for growth since mid-1970s. He also claims 
that SSA is the most natural resource abundant region after the Middle East.  But at the same time, 
there are only two SSA countries (Seychelles—54 and Mail—74) in the first 100 rank according to the 
Human Development Index of 2008 (HDI 2008).  Moreover, 24 countries out of 25 that have “low human 
development” are from SSA with high level of poverty influencing human development measures (life 
expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita). Hence, efficient utilization of natural 
wealth is critical, and financial sector development can contribute to an efficient allocation of resources. 
SUB-Saharan Financial Sectors:  Financial sectors in SSA countries are among the least developed in the 
world. To some extent this can be blamed on misguided policies of the past that encouraged substantial 
political  interference  in  the  operation  of  financial  institutions.    Historically,  SSA  countries  placed 
significant emphasis on building and protecting the real sector, and most countries believed they could 
reach their development objectives through selective credit allocation. 
 
As economic and financial conditions were deteriorating in the late 1980s and early 1990s, SSA countries 
embarked on a policy of dismantling controls. These reforms usually included (1) granting central banks 
more autonomy to conduct monetary policy; (2) liberalizing interest rates and eliminating administrative 
allocation  of  credit;  (3)  transitioning  from  direct  to  indirect  monetary  policy  implementation;  (4) 
restructuring  banks  to  restore  their  solvency;  and  (5)  improving  infrastructure,  especially  bank 
supervision. Steps were also taken to liberalize the external current and capital accounts. 
 
While the pace of reform has varied and some restrictions remain in place in some countries, progress in 
liberalizing financial markets has been substantial through SSA.  However, financial intermediation is still 
low, and by some measures has even declined. For instance, between the early 1980s and the end of 
2004, the simple SSA average of private sector bank credit to GDP fell from 15.6 percent to 15.1 percent. 
Excluding  15  countries  whose  financial  sectors  showed  signs  of  sustained  development  during  this 
period, the average private sector credit to GDP ratio declined from 17.2 percent in the early 1980s to 
8.7 percent by the end of 2004. This is all the more striking considering that during this period efforts to 
liberalize the financial sector were combined with greater discipline in implementing monetary policy, 
which in most SSA countries pushed down inflation outcomes and lowered fiscal deficits (McDonald and 
Schumacher, 2007). 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper relied on the literature review of current relevant articles focusing on financial development 
and economic growth in SSA.  Except where a source was needed specifically for its perspective on 
broad  issues  relating  to  financial  development  and  SSA,  the  author  screened  papers  by  “financial 
development”, “Sub-Saharan Africa” “financial system in Sub-Saharan Africa” and by numerous variants 
of  keywords,  focusing  specifically  on  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Source  papers  included  refereed  research 
studies,  empirical  reports,  and  articles  from  professional  journals.    Since  the  literature  relating  to 
financial development and Sub-Saharan Africa is voluminous, the author used several decision rules in 
choosing articles.  First, because financial sector is changing fast in today’s environment, the author used 
mostly  sources  published  from 2000-2011,  except  where  articles  were  needed  specifically  for  their 
historical perspectives.  Second, given the author’s aim to provide a practical understanding of the main 
issues in financial development, he included, in order of priority: refereed empirical research papers, 
reports, and other relevant literatures on current trends in financial systems development.  To get some     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
          October 2011, Vol. 1, No. 3 
ISSN: 2222-6990 
 
293    www.hrmars.com/journals 
 
perspective on the current state of financial development and economic growth, the author began with 
a review of the current literature.   
 
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Institutions and Financial Development:  Theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the need to pay 
more  attention  to  institutional  development  as  institutions  play  a  vital  role  in  financial  sector 
development. North (1990) offers the following definition for institutions: “Institutions are the rules of 
the  game  in  a  society  or,  more  formally,  are  the  humanly  devised  constraints  that  shape  human 
interaction.”    Institutions determine the costs of acting  in  different  ways  in political and  economic 
contexts. 
North (1990) examines the nature of institutions and the consequences of institutions for economic 
performance and applies his theories to a range of historical examples, including the development of 
financial markets.  Some cross-country studies (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2004; Honohan, 2003) 
have shown that countries with better-developed financial intermediaries experience faster declines in 
measures  of  both  poverty  and  income  inequality,  underscoring  that  the  development  of  financial 
markets and institutions is helpful in reducing poverty. 
 
Many  researchers  have  shown  that  the  institutional  environment  has  an  important  impact  on  the 
functioning of the financial sector (Tressel and Detriagiache, 2008; Demetriades and Fielding, 2009). La 
Porta et al ( 1998) argues that legal origin determines the level of financial development.  He suggests 
that common law-based systems, originating from English law, are better suited for development of 
financial markets than civil law systems, arguing that common law has been instrumental in protecting 
private property than civil law, which aims at addressing corruption in the judiciary and improving the 
power of the state. 
 
Roe and Siegel (2009) stress the role of political stability in financial sector development. Contrary to 
works of La Porta, they find that current political instability explains the level of financial development 
more  than  historical  legal  origin.  They  link  political  stability  to  economic  growth  and  financial 
development, which is close to the idea of Rajan and Zingales (2003) in exploring political economy as 
determinants of financial development.  In their work Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that simultaneous 
opening of both trade and capital account hold is the key to successful financial development.  Opening 
trade and capital account not only fosters competition and reduces inefficiencies, but might also give 
incumbents new opportunities that will bring them even higher profits to cover any negative effect from 
higher competition. 
 
Djankow, MacLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) explore credit institutions in 129 countries over 25 years and 
show that contract rights and enforcement institutions play a big role in the development of financial 
markets.  Their  findings  show  statistical  significance  of  creditors’  rights  and  information  sharing 
institutions for private credit.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) highlight the importance of property right 
institutions.  They argue that property right institutions have a crucial power in determining long-run 
growth,  investment  and  financial  development,  whereas  contractual  institutions  shape  financial 
intermediation and slightly influence growth and financial development. 
 
Studies show that institutional factors are also crucial for financial development in SSA.  Demetriadess 
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main challenges for financial development in eight countries of West Africa.  McDonald and Schumacher 
(2007)  point  to  financial  liberalization,  stronger  legal  institutions,  legal  origin,  lower  inflation,  and 
increased sharing of information as key contributing factors for financial sector development in SSA.  
Some  studies  on  Asian  countries  consider  political  institution  and  political  party  structures  (Zhang, 
2006),  rule  of  law,  political  stability,  government  effectiveness,  and  regulatory  quality  (Gani  and 
Ngassam, 2008) as main drivers of financial development.  Other studies have a broader coverage.  For 
example, Huang (2005) explores the effect of political liberalization on financial development in 90 
developed and developing countries based on political liberalization and freedom indexes.  Ito (2006) 
examines  the  relationship  of  institutions  and  financial  development  considering  financial  openness, 
corruption, and law and order as main challenges.  He finds that financial openness stimulates equity 
market development only if some threshold level of legal development has been attained. 
 
Debt Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa:  The debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative has help to improve SSA external debt situation. Thirty-three SSA countries were considered 
HIPC and a large number of them have benefited from the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and 
the bilateral debt cancellation measures, which were launched in 1996.  As a result, SSA external debt 
has fallen considerably from an average of 103 percent of GDP in 1995-2000 to about 34 percent of GDP 
in 2001-08. By the end of 2008, external debt to GDP had dropped to its lowest level since 1980, 
constituting 20.4 percent of GDP.  In contrast, the domestic debt market is growing rapidly.  SSA’s 
domestic debt as a share of GDP has doubled to about 22.4 percent between 2001-2008 from an 
average of about 11 percent between 1980 and 1989 (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). 
 
Nonbank financial institutions are widely regarded as being critical for bond market development given 
their long-term investment strategies.  If bond markets are underdeveloped, both pension funds and 
insurance companies are forced to hold short-term securities, which do not correspond to the liability 
side of their balance sheet and therefore expose them to maturity mismatches.  In order to meet the 
growing demand for longer dated securities from nonbank institutional investors, several countries (e.g., 
Kenyan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia) have pursued strategies to lengthen the maturities of their 
government bonds up to 10 and 15 years.  Longer-term instruments help pension funds manage some 
risks, as well as provide useful benchmark for pricing long-term assets (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 
2009). 
 
Creditor Rights, Financial Development and Growth:  A fast-growing literature has found a clear link 
between financial development and growth. Countries with better-functioning institutions and markets 
grow faster.  King and Levine (1993) reported that financial development, proxied by several measures 
of financial deepness (such as bank liabilities and bank credit), predicted long-run economic growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity increases for a sample of 77 countries for 1960-89.  The results 
tended to hold for smaller samples of countries.  Omitting SSA countries did not significantly alter the 
results.  Levine and Zevros (1998) used indices of stock market development to measure the finance-
growth link and found that whether a financial system is bank-based or equity-based does not seem to 
matter much. To rule out simultaneity bias, Levine, Loayaza, and Beck (2000) dealt directly with the 
issue of causality by using instrumental variables in cross-country studies of growth. They concluded 
that there is a very strong connection between growth and the exogenous component of financial 
development. 
 
Although the relationship between growth and financial development has been found to be strong, the 
channels  by  which  financial  development  causes  growth  are  still  under  discussion.    Levine  (2005)     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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identifies  some  functions  that  financial  intermediaries  have  traditionally  performed  that  improve 
welfare: production of ex ante information about possible investments; monitoring of investments and 
implementation of corporate governance; diversification and management of risks, including liquidity 
risk;  mobilization  and  pooling  of  savings;  and  facilitation  of  exchange  of  goods  and  services.    He 
concludes  that,  to  the  extent  that  each  of  these  functions  may  influence  savings  and  investment 
decision, they can also influence economic growth.  However, exactly how services provided by financial 
intermediaries influence growth is not well understood. 
 
If financial development is good for growth and probably reduces inequality, a crucial question for 
countries that need to grow fast, such as those in SSA, is how to ensure that all obstacles to financial 
intermediation  have  been  eliminated.  Recent  studies  have  focused  on  the  links  between  financial 
development and the legal institutions that can facilitate credit contract, exploring the nature of those 
contracts based on the power theory of credit, information theories of credit, and the legal origin of 
institutions (e.g., French or English).  These theories are complementary rather than alternative; they 
explain how legal institutions could boost financial intermediation and facilitate access to credit for a 
large number of customers, some with new and small projects (McDonald and Schumacher, 2007). 
The power theory of credit emphasizes that financial institutions would be more willing to extend credit 
if, in case of default, they could easily enforce contracts by forcing repayment or seizing collateral. The 
amount of credit in a country would then depend to some extent on the existence of legislation that 
protects creditor rights and on the quality of procedures that lead to repayment. 
 
For the information theories of credit, the amount of credit to firms and individuals would be larger if 
financial institutions could better predict the probability of repayment by their potential customers. 
Consequently, the more banks know about the credit history of prospective borrowers, the deeper 
credit background check they can carry out. 
 
Efficient exchange of information can reduce the cost of screening borrowers. In advanced countries, 
databases  centralizing  information  on  borrowers  are  often  established  by  the  private  sector  or 
maintained by central banks.  These registries collect information on the standing of borrowers in the 
financial system and make it available to lenders.  The system improves transparency, rewarding good 
borrowers and increasing the cost of default, and could reduce the reliance of the poor on informal 
finance.  McDonald and Schumacher (2007), and Singh et al. (2009) show that information-sharing is 
associated with greater financial development. 
 
Legal origin also has implications for financial developments.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2002) 
identified a political and an adaptability channel through which legal origin affects credit markets.  The 
political  channels  depends  on  the  balance  between  state  power  and  private  property  rights.  For 
example, civil law that promotes institutions that favor state power over private property rights would 
tend to have adverse implications for the growth of credit markets.  The adaptability channel recognizes 
that legal tradition differ in their ability to evolve with changing conditions.  It has been argued, for 
instance, that common law traditions evolve efficiently because judges respond case by case to changing 
conditions. Both channels imply that countries whose law is French in origin should have on average 
substantially slower financial development than British common law countries. 
 
Empirical evidence supports this institutional approach.  Djankov, McLiesh, and Sheleifer (2005) found 
from data for 149 countries that, after controlling for macroeconomic factors like GDP growth, inflation, 
and fiscal imbalances, legal institutions have made a clear contribution to the development of financial     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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markets. Similar findings were reported by Galindo and Micco (2001) in cross-sectional regression of 
Latin American countries. This author concurs with the evidence on the importance of institutions for 
financial development in SSA countries. 
 
Supervision  in  SSA:  Many  sources—among  them  the  Joint  World  Bank-IMF  Sector  Assessment 
Programs (FSAP)—concur that supervisory capacity remains limited in most of SSA.  Many supervisory 
agencies or departments are understaffed and lack essential skills.  Compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) is low and supervisory enforcement is also often very 
low.  Supervision of nonbank sector is even weaker—or nonexistent.  However, recent years, several 
countries have embarked on major reform programs (often following FSAPs) to upgrade their regulatory 
frameworks and banking supervisory skills. 
 
Summary of the Supervisory Structure: Some Key Observations 
 
Central banks are the dominant supervisors for banks in SSA. The legacy of the colonial powers is visible: 
countries with the British tradition typically house bank supervision in the central bank, while most 
French colonies established bank supervision in a separate agency. 
 
Central banks are also often called upon to organize supervision for deposit-taking NBFIs as a natural 
extension  of  their  bank  supervisory  responsibility.    In  more  countries,  the  central  bank  has  some 
responsibility in supervising this group of institutions.  As a logical consequence, the same is happening 
with respect to microfinance.  Some countries are well advanced in supervising these institutions, while 
in others, central banks have been recently assigned the regulatory and supervisory responsibility over 
microfinance institutions, and are trying to develop capacity in this area. 
 
In several cases, the supervisory responsibility of the central banks goes further than banks and other 
deposit-taking institutions, making the central bank the dominant supervisor. For instance, Nigeria and 
Uganda,  the  central  bank  is  also  the  pension  fund  supervisor;  in Mozambique,  the  stock  exchange 
supervisor; and in Swaziland the insurance supervisor.  More generally, in a number of cases the central 
banks seem to be the supervisor-by-default, given the lack of capacity outside the central bank (Quintyn 
and Taylor, 2007). 
 
Stock Markets and Financial Development:  Fifteen SSA countries have stock markets, most of them 
established over the past decade.  The value and role of stock markets in financing industry has been 
debated in advanced as well as developing countries.  While advocates point to the need for long-term 
finance, others fear that generally weak regulation will hinder market efficiency and the value of price 
signals in allocating investment resources. 
 
Stock  markets  in  SSA  remain  immature.  Except  in  South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe,  average  market 
capitalization is about 27 percent of GDP; it is as low as 1.4 percent in Uganda.  This contrasts with 
emerging markets like Malaysia, which has a capitalization ratio of about 161 percent.  Market liquidity 
is also very low:  turnover ratios are as little as 0.02 percent in Swaziland compared with about 29 
percent in Mexico.  Low liquidity implies greater difficulty in supporting a local market with its own 
trading system, market analysis, and brokers, because of the low business volume.  In most SSA stock 
markets,  informational  and  disclosure  deficiencies  prevent  trading  in  most  listed  stocks.    Further, 
supervision by regulatory authorities is often inadequate (Regional Economic Outlook, 2006).       International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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Stock markets in SSA have contributed to financing for listed companies but there is no evidence yet of 
broader economic benefits. Corporate financing pattern in certain SSA countries suggests that stock 
markets are an important source of finance.  In Ghana, the stock market financed about 28 percent of 
total asset growth of listed companies between 1995-2002, 16 percent in South Africa between 1996-
2000, and 8 percent in Zimbabwe between 1995-1999. In all three countries, the stock markets were for 
those companies the single most important sources of long-term finance.  However, it remains unclear 
whether these economies  have  benefited  through,  for  example,  greater  savings  and  investment or 
increased investment productivity. Finally, to date all SSA stock markets remain dependent on regional 
government subsidies for their operations (Regional Economic Outlook, 2006). 
 
4.  FINDINGS 
 
The main findings of the research are as follows:  Financial deepening could narrow income inequalities 
and reduce poverty, and that stronger property rights reinforce these effects.  However, liberalizing 
interest rates and lending alone could be detrimental to the poor if not accompanied by institutional 
reforms, in particular stronger property rights and wider access to creditor information. 
Savings constraint is a key impediment to financial market deepening and development of the domestic 
bond market. Low savings result in a low level of financial intermediation by banks. 
 
A confluence of many variables drives the level of development of the domestic bond market in SSA, and 
that no single class of variables is wholly responsible for the underdevelopment of the domestic bond 
markets in SSA. Structure, investment profile, law and order, size of the banking sector, and level of 
economic  development  all  matter  for  domestic  bond  market  development  in  SSA.    Similarly, 
macroeconomic  factors  such  as  interest  rates,  exchange  rates,  the  presence  or  absence  of  capital 
controls, and fiscal balances also matter. 
 
Insufficient legal protection of creditor rights and information asymmetries about borrowers’ ability and 
willingness to repay debts could explain why most financial markets remain shallow in SSA. 
There is a strong correlation between legal and oversight institutions and financial development.  While 
financial liberalization and macroeconomic stability promote deeper financial markets, when financial 
liberalization efforts are similar, those countries with stronger creditor rights and information sharing 
have deeper financial systems in SSA. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Institutions  and  Financial  Development:  The  literature  review  presented  above  underscores  the 
importance of institutional reforms for SSA countries.  Verriest (2009) points out that changes in the 
institutional environment are even more sensitive to weak institutional settings such as in SSA countries.  
Others (Demetriades et al 2009) argue that financial depth (credit to private sector/GDP) is shallow in 
SSA economies not because of the lack in the creditworthiness of the borrowers, but because of the lack 
of  developed  infrastructure  that  would  enable  banks  to  screen  and  monitor  borrowers.    Another 
consideration in SSA is the heavy dependence on foreign aid, both financial and technical assistance, 
from various international and/or foreign organizations/donors. Nkusu and Sayek (2004) demonstrate 
that  development  of  the  local  financial  market  positively  enhances  the  impact  of  aid,  which  is 
significantly larger when local financial markets are more developed. 
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Debt  Markets  Development:  Promoting  domestic  bond  market  development  is  becoming  also 
important due to benefits stemming from improved efficiency in its functioning. Domestic bond markets 
enhance capital allocation by directing savings towards assets with a higher return, provide alternative 
sources of financing, and facilitating risk management through distributing risk among different groups 
of  investors.    The  development  of  the  domestic  bond  market  as  sub-segment  of  financial  market 
contributes to the growth of a country’s financial system. 
 
Developing  SSA  bond  markets  has  also  become  an  important  policy  focus  of  multilateral  financial 
institutions.  A joint initiative of the IMF and World Bank has been launched to assist, inter alia SSA 
countries,  in  building  up  bond  markets  by  developing  effective  medium-term  debt  management 
strategies that are consistent with the goal of maintaining debt sustainability. The question is whether 
this  initiative  will  have  the  desired  effect  in  terms  of  bond  market  development.  While  there  are 
conflicting views on the determinants of bond market development, most argue that fundamentals such 
as stable macroeconomic policies, improved regulation, enhance transparency, and stronger investor 
protection are particularly important. 
 
A number of SSA countries have recently decided to upgrade the investment guideline for nonbank 
financial  institutions,  recognizing  the  significance  of  soundness  rules  for  promoting  bond  market 
development.    It  is  important  that  rules  governing  portfolio  investments  for  nonbank  financial 
institutions aim at: (i) limiting risks and mismatches, which may occur on the balance sheets of these 
institutions; and (ii) setting sound principles for investments.  On the one hand, it is also essential that 
institutional investors should not be compelled to hold the majority of their portfolios in government 
bonds because it may lead to creation of “captive” markets.  Principles governing investments in credit 
quality papers and foreign currency denominated securities, as well as accounting rules requiring mark 
to market valuations, are yet to be established by SSA countries. 
 
There is still potential for further growth of investments by institutional investor in domestic bond 
markets.  Further reforms in the pension fund system, in particular the shift toward funded schemes, are 
likely to have a positive impact on the assets of the pension sector and insurance companies (Adelegan 
and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). 
 
Savings constraint is a key impediment to financial market deepening and development of domestic 
bond markets.  Low savings will result in low level of financial intermediation by the banks.  On average, 
gross savings as a share of GDP for SSA countries was 18.1 percent in 2008, while gross investment as a 
share of GDP was 27.3 percent.  On average, private savings as a share of GDP was 9.8 percent in 2008, 
and 11 percent between 1991 and 2008. The regional aggregates disguise considerable variation in 
private savings as a share of GDP across countries.  Only five SSA countries (i.e., about 40 percent) had 
private savings that were less than 10 percent of GDP in 2008. Private dissavings (negative savings) as a 
share of GDP are as low as about negative 21 percent for the Republic of Congo.  On the other hand, 
private savings was as high as about 40 percent for Botswana in 2008. The median savings ratio as a 
share of GDP in 2008 was 9.9 percent (Adelegan, 2008). 
 
Typically the savings shortfall pertains to both private and public sectors, but the savings-investment gap 
is wider for the public sector.  The public sector shortfall tends to crowd out investment in the private 
sector by limiting the flow of private savings available for domestic intermediation.  Fundamentally, very 
low domestic savings is a major constraint on domestic bond market development in SSA economies.     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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Policy Measures for Dealing with the Challenges of Low Domestic Savings:  Fiscal policy measure:  
Fiscal policy measures can be used to correct the public sector’s negative current account balances, as 
well as the imbalance between savings and investment in the private sector.  A useful policy handle is 
savings incentives in terms of an interest rate policy that will encourage savings.  Private savings can be 
mobilized through increases in interest rates. 
 
Broader access to financial services:  Generally, poor domestic savings is a major constraint confronting 
SSA countries.  There is a need to access capital from elsewhere to finance growth and innovation and 
deepen the market.  Bond market development is expected to make an important contribution to 
economic  growth  through  improving  access  for  firms  (Adelegan,  2008).    Modern  development 
economists have emphasized that broader access to financial services should be a central development 
agenda of financial sector reforms (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). 
 
Promotion of Growth:  For a number of low-income countries, consumption and growth are low.  Any 
increase  in  income  is  diverted  towards  greater  consumption.    Policies  that  are  geared  towards 
promoting growth will also promote savings and facilitate market deepening. 
External Financing:  The role that the external sector can play in financial market deepening is also 
crucial. The reason that external financing increased was because of low savings and the unavailability of 
local finance.  External finance potentially has a role to play in deepening the financial market and 
facilitating the development of the bond market (Adelegan and Radzewick-Bak, 2009). 
 
Supervision:    Chandler’s  statement that “Strategy  follows  strategy”  is  particularly  applicable  to  the 
design of financial sector supervisor in SSA in which the first step needs to be the development of a 
“regulatory strategy” to prioritize sectors that need a supervisory framework and to determine the 
intensity with which these sectors should be supervised. Regulatory structures, in turn, need to follow 
this strategy in a way that will allow a flexible response to future developments in the financial systems. 
Such a strategy also needs to take into account the ubiquitous issue of capacity constraints, which, in 
many ways, is the crux of the regulatory problem in the SSA.  Any strategy should also take into account 
the need to keep the central banks involved in the supervisory process. 
 
Capacity Constraint:  Capacity constraints are major hurdles for any reform in SSA.  Supervisory agencies 
in most SSA countries lack skilled and trained staff, as well as the equipment and infrastructure to 
conduct  on-site  inspections  and  off-site  supervision.    Salary  scales  are  typically  low,  making  staff 
retention a major challenge because, once trained and proficient, staff is easily lured away by higher 
paying commercial banks or other financial institutions. 
 
In addition, supervisory skill must continuously evolve in response to industry trends.  In recent years, 
the  widespread  adoption  of  risk-based  supervision,  combined  with  ever  more  complex  banking 
regulations and supervision has placed a premium on the constant upgrading of supervisory skills. Thus, 
countries  that  are  unable  to  provide  the  right  incentives  to  attract  and  retain  suitably  qualified 
supervisory staff run the risk of falling ever further behind supervisory practice in the rest of the world. 
The design of supervisory structure will have to take into account these capacity constraints for the 
foreseeable future. Capacity constraints clearly argue against setting up separate agencies for each 
segment  of  the  system,  as  this  would  result  in  a  spreading  of  resources  too  thinly  across  several 
different regulatory bodies. It also calls in question plans that would merely upgrade or strengthen 
existing separate agencies.  Faced with capacity constraints it is crucial to pursue economies of scale.     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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The issue on institution design has also implication for the ability of the regulatory agency or agencies to 
attract and retain suitably qualified staff and the incentive structures faced by regulatory personnel.  
Finally, capacity constraints also argue for retaining a role for the central bank in the supervisory process 
as of the better-resourced institutions in most countries (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). 
 
The Role of the Central Bank:  In the specific case of SSA, there are some strong arguments for central 
banks  to  remain  involved  in  financial  sector  supervision.  These  arguments  tend  to  outweigh  the 
standard arguments in favor of the separation of monetary policy and supervision, at least at the current 
stage of development in SSA.  In line with Goodhart (2002), the author see three major arguments for 
keeping the central bank involved in the regulatory process.   
 
First, it can reasonably be expected that the banking sectors will remain the dominant segment in the 
financial systems in the foreseeable future.  Moreover, the central banks are currently responsible for 
banking supervision in a large number of countries. This role is partly the result of historical factors, but 
also reflects the synergies between banking supervision and monetary policy, which are particularly 
important in bank-dominated financial systems. There are also important information advantages in 
keeping banking supervision and monetary policy in the same institution, as the information collected 
for the two functions overlaps to a great extent.  Hence, the combination of the synergies between 
monetary policy and banking supervision, and the expectation that banks will remain dominant justifies 
a continued supervisory role for the central banks.   
 
Second,  developing  economies  are  more  prone  than  advanced  economies  to  periods  of  financial 
instability  or  even  financial  crises.    This  places  a  particularly  high  premium  on  the  strength  and 
effectiveness of crisis management arrangements.  The central bank is an indispensable part of these 
arrangements, both because of its traditional lender-of-last-resort function and also because it often 
possesses the greatest expertise in the financial sector.  Most ministries of finance lack the skilled and 
experienced staff needed to take on a lead role in crisis management.  By contrast, there is a greater 
likelihood that, if these resources are to be found anywhere, they are to be found in the central bank.  
Thus, keeping a meaningful role for the central bank facilitates coordination at times of crises. 
The third, and arguably the strongest, reason is that in many developing countries, central banks are 
often one of the few reputable institutions with a reasonable degree of independence from the political 
process and also from commercial interest (Regional Economic Outlook, 2006). 
 
In developing a regulatory strategy, two issues need to be considered, which are (i) at which point in 
time during its development should a segment of the financial system be regulated and, thus be brought 
into the supervisory net.  This is the issue of scope; and (ii) once a segment has been identified as 
needing supervision, what type of regulatory and supervisory regime should be imposed.  This is the 
issue of intensity. Such a regulatory strategy will need to be regularly updated to stay abreast of market 
developments and contain, monitor, or control emerging risks, particularly in an environment where 
public confidence in financial systems is fragile and could be undermined easily by a crisis. The primary 
purpose of developing a regulatory strategy is to allow strategy and structure to be considered together.  
The agreed-upon structure should be such that it serves the strategy by allowing for scale economies 
and building capacity (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). 
 
The two most important factors to be taken into account in supervisory and regulatory framework are 
the countries’ capacity constraints and the need to keep a role of the central bank in the supervisory 
process.     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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Stock Markets:  The literature suggests that the following preconditions are necessary if countries are to 
benefit from stock market development, some of which are lacking in some SSA countries: (1) Sound 
macroeconomic environments and sufficiently high income levels.  Income levels, domestic savings, and 
investment  are  important  determinants  of  stock  market  development  in  emerging  markets;  (2) 
Appropriate sequencing.  Stock markets should follow depth. Research shows that a percentage point 
increase in financial sector development increases stock market development in SSA by .06 percentage 
point, controlling for macroeconomic stability, economic  development, and the quality of legal and 
political institutions;  and (3) Transparent and accountable institutions.  Good quality institutions, law 
and order, democratic accountability, and limited corruption are also important determinants of stock 
market development. These factors reduce political risk and enhance the viability of external finance. 
Stock markets now face the challenge of regionalization and need better technical and institutional 
development. While analysts have argued for regionalization in SSA as a way to overcome small market 
size, there are important preconditions for successful regional approaches, such as legal harmonization 
(bankruptcy and accounting laws) and a liberalized trade regime.  Robust electronic trading systems and 
central depository systems will also be important.  Other financial sector reforms—steps to improve the 
legal  and  accounting  framework,  private  sector  credit  evaluation  capabilities,  and  public  sector 
regulatory oversight—would also be beneficial (Regional Economic Outlook, 2006). 
 
6.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY IN SSA 
 
Institutions and Financial Development:  It is intuitive that institutional factors do influence financial 
systems through various direct and indirect channels.  However, simply because of having very limited 
resources and a number of constraints (e.g., limited knowledge base, limited financial resources, and 
cultural  factors)  institutions  can  only  be  improved  slowly.    Hence,  it  is  extremely  important  for 
policymakers to know which institutional factors are critical for financial sector development.  While 
strategic goals vary from country to country and certain factors can be less, or more important for 
policymakers, this paper provides some evidence that institutional factors matter, which could help 
guide  the  sequencing of  institutional  reforms to  promote  financial  sector  development  (Nkusu  and 
Sayek, 2004). 
 
Debt Markets:  The above analysis shows that savings constraint is a key impediment to financial market 
deepening and development of the domestic bond market.  Low savings result in a low level of financial 
intermediation by bank.  On average across countries, an expansion in domestic debt has a crowding-
out effect on private debt.  Overall, the analysis show that a confluence of many variables drives the 
level of development of the domestic bond market in SSA, and that no single class of variables is wholly 
responsible for the underdevelopment of the domestic bond market.  Structure, investment profile, law 
and order, size of the banking sector, and level of economic development measured by per capita 
income all matter  for domestic bond market development in SSA.  Similarly, macroeconomic factors 
such as interest rates, exchange rates, the presence or absence of capital controls, and fiscal balances 
also matter (Adelegan, 2008). 
 
The  factors  that  explain  the  level  of  development  of  the  domestic  debt  market  in  SSA  are  the 
developmental stage of the economy measured by the safety of the investment environment, such as: 
contract viability, profit repatriation, and payment delays; bureaucratic quality; level of interest rates 
and volatility of changes in exchange rates, capital controls, and fiscal balances (Demirgue-Kunt et al., 
2008).     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
          October 2011, Vol. 1, No. 3 
ISSN: 2222-6990 
 
302    www.hrmars.com/journals 
 
Creditor Rights:  The main policy implication is that protection of creditor rights in SSA deserves more 
attention. This is one area where reform, though much needed, has been lacking. Creditor rights in SSA 
are inadequate in terms of both regulation and its enforcement. 
 
Strengthening creditor rights is, however, complex. First, it requires changes to legislation governing 
debt collection and collateral.  In some cases reforms may have both regional and national dimensions 
that should be addressed.  For example, the uniform commercial acts enacted by the Organization for 
the Harmonization of African Business Laws (OHADA), apply to matters like debt collection, collateral, 
and bankruptcy in most francophone African countries, but the necessary procedures are specified by 
domestic legislation.  For countries that are part of monetary unions, regulations related to some forms 
of financial crimes and corruption, such as money-laundering, and issued by regional bodies.  Reform 
efforts should look at flaws and gaps in both national and regional legislation (Levine, 2005). 
 
The  institutional  infrastructure  should  also  be  revised  to  make  collateralized  loans  more  generally 
available. For example, the ability to register property efficiently would help to build financial markets, 
because banks prefer land and buildings as collateral and the availability of collateral is crucial for bank 
willingness to grant credit.  In turn, to register a property, its boundaries have to be determined and for 
this, cadastres and land surveys should be promoted.  Good legislation on debt recovery depends on 
efficient  property  registration  and  land  surveying  in  both  cities  and  countryside  (McDonald  and 
Schumacher, 2007). 
 
A Need for a Forward-Looking Reform Strategy:  Financial sector needs to be a reform priority for SSA.  
At present, they neither support economic development nor improve the quality of services available to 
the poor.  Against this background of increasing empirical and survey evidence linking finance with 
growth,  and  the  identification  in  many  SSA  countries  of  access  limit  as  important  obstacle  to  the 
expansion of firms, financial sector reform is one of the keys to progress on growth in SSA.   
 
While research on how best to address financial sector challenges is still under review, reforms should 
be directed to key obstacles. By now, there is considerable evidence on common bottlenecks as well as 
lessons  learned  from  earlier  reform  efforts.    Renewed  reforms  should  at  first  focus  on  obstacles 
identified in numerous studies and seek to improve implementation of reforms based on lesson from 
the past.  While important issues will apply to all countries, financial sector reforms should acknowledge 
country-specific factors, such as their level of development. 
 
The  following  key  priorities  are  proposed:  Eliminate  distortions:    While  banks  on  average  are 
profitable, more dynamic development of the banking sector is hampered by manifold restrictions and 
supervisory forbearance.  Remaining important restrictions are interest rate controls and the excessive 
use  of  costly  regulatory  monetary  instruments,  such  as  high  reserve  requirements.    Eliminating  or 
reducing  such  restrictions  could  spur  development  of  the  banking  sector.    Similarly,  an  end  to 
supervisory forbearance would allow better pricing of risk and facilitate interbank relations. 
 
Increase market size:  Empirical evidence finds high costs for financial market development from small 
market size.  At least 14 SSA countries belong to monetary unions and should be working to promote 
financial integration so that members will benefit more fully from a large market.  Other countries will 
benefit more fully from a larger market.  Other countries would benefit from a harmonized approach to 
regulate in the context to low restrictions to market entry, to all financial firms to benefit from economic 
of scale and scope.     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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Promote a prudential framework in line with economic situation:  Prudential frameworks have been 
developed for more diversified economies.  In SSA, some prudential rules, such as the ones on risk 
diversification, are routinely violated, and others, such as minimum capital levels, and zero risk weights 
for government debt, may not be appropriate for the different levels of risk.  In the context of efforts to 
review the appropriateness of the prudential framework, and with many SSA countries considering Basel 
II, this may be an opportune time to revise the prudential framework for SSA .  SSA countries should be 
active in international forums discussing such issues. 
 
Apply the legal and regulatory framework even-handedly.  Improved governance of the economy must 
be  supported  by  evenhanded  application  of  the  legal  framework,  which  is  more  likely  if  there  are 
commercial courts and perhaps specialized judges.  Differences in commercial law and practice among 
those countries that already have harmonized their laws should be reviewed regularly and if necessary 
amended (Regional Economic Outlook, 2006). 
 
7.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR SSA ECONOMIES 
 
Debt Markets:  A regional approach to bond market development should be considered:  Structural 
factors, such as the size of the economy, its openness, and the origin of its legal system may be difficult 
to change.  However, other factors such as the small size may be overcome through a regional approach 
to domestic bond market development. 
The  investment  environment  should  be  improved:    Greater  efforts  and  increased  funding  would 
strengthen  the  safety  of  the  investment  environment  to  ensure  contract  viability,  ease  of  profit 
repatriation and minimization of payment delays, and reliability of enforcement of law and order.  These 
improvements will raise the level of economic development and ultimately bond market development. 
Competition should be encouraged:  SSA countries can also accelerate the development of their bond 
market by encouraging competition in financial intermediation and a reduction in their bureaucratic 
practices. 
 
Governments should implement appropriate macroeconomic policies:  The level and volatility of interest 
rates, the volatility of changes in the exchange rates, and capital controls are important in domestic  
While these recommendations are designed to promote development of bond markets in SSA,  care 
must be taken. For example, capital account liberalization prior to domestic market development offers 
risks as well as rewards.  In addition, governments seeking bond market development need to adhere to 
international standards by securities issuing firms and encourage growth and competition in banking so 
as  to  minimize  the  substitutability  of  banks  and  bond  market  intermediation,  and  promote 
complementarity between the banking system and bond market development.  The authorities will also 
need  to  follow  stable  macroeconomic  policies  to  make  it  attractive  to  hold  domestic  currency 
denominated debt instruments and thereby develop a deep and liquid domestic debt market (Adelegan 
and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). 
 
Creditors Rights:  Loan and other form banking sector services are jeopardized by the existence of 
informal finance mechanisms.  Informal finance should be discouraged because it functions outside the 
supervisory framework that ensures that only those who comply with the requirements to become 
bankers could deal with the savings of the population.  One way to prevent further disintermediation is 
to apply anti-money-laundering regulations, which in many countries apply only to the formal banking 
sector, to the informal financial sector.     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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SSA countries should also increase the sharing of information in credit markets.  One major constraint 
here is that many countries setting up private credit bureaus is not considered commercially viable.  
Some  countries,  however,  have  found  that  having  the  government  or  central  bank  set  up  public 
registries can be extremely productive.  Once they are established and coverage is increased, it may be 
possible to turn them over to the private sector. Bilateral and multilateral partners can step up their 
assistance  for  such  registries.  Credit  bureaus  should  cover  as much  information  as  possible  on the 
repayment profile of customers, including information on payments of utilities services, rent, and loans 
made by micro lending institutions (McDonald and Schumacher, 2007). 
 
Supervision:  The author recommendation is that countries develop a regulatory strategy.  This should 
be built around two types of decisions to develop regulatory capacity: (i) ) at which point in time during 
its development should a segment of the financial system be regulated and, thus be brought into the 
supervisory net.  This is the issue of scope; and (ii) once a segment has been identified as needing 
supervision, what type of regulatory and supervisory regime should be imposed.  This is the issue of 
intensity.  Following  Chandler’s  remarks  on  strategy and  structure,  the  author  recommend  that  the 
institutional structure of regulation should be design in light of a country’s regulatory strategy (Quintyn 
and  Taylor,  2007).  The  presence  of strong  corporate  governance mechanisms  will  also  help  boost 
investor confidence in regulatory issues (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). 
 
Reforms  in  a  range  of  areas  could  support  development  of  the  SSA’s  stock  markets  and  in  turn 
contribute to economic growth.  Steps to improve the legal and accounting framework, private sector 
evaluation capabilities, and public sector regulatory oversight would also be beneficial. Appropriate 
sequencing of reforms is important:  stock markets tend to develop only after financial sectors have 
reached a certain depth (Regional Economic Outlook, 2010). 
Procedures for handling a systemic crisis or failures within all the financial services markets should be 
drawn up promptly in preparation for contingencies (IMF African Department, 2009). 
 
8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
SSA central banks must give adequate weight to financial sector stability against a tradition in the region 
that has long focused on financial sector development.  The banking system is the main conduit through 
which foreign inflows are intermediated, and so bank capital and risk management practices must be 
monitored carefully.  However, the challenges for central banks go well beyond assessing the capacity of 
the capital base of a commercial bank to absorb the kinds of shocks that lead to more nonperforming 
loans.  Links between various parts of the financial markets, such as bank and the stock markets, must 
be assessed, as must the foreign exchange market implications of macroeconomic-driven shifts in bank 
balance sheet (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). 
 
The  rise  of  some  SSA  countries  to  emerging  market  status  gives  them  a  tremendous  economic 
opportunity. Access to capital markets is a key ingredient to high and sustainable private sector-led 
growth, and this access had long seemed out of reach for SSA; it is now a reality.  Evidence is already 
mounting  that  financial  flows  are  being  translated  into  growth  in  financial  intermediation  in  these 
countries. To help ensure sustained growth, the countries must ensure that macroeconomic policy and 
capital account prudential policies are tailored to avoid the traps of volatile short-term flows, and that 
supervision promotes financial sector stability and effective intermediation (Nellor, 2008). 
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Finally,  deepening  domestic  financial  market  is  key  to  enhancing  their  capacity  to  handle  external 
financial volatility over the long term.  As mentioned earlier, interbank, capital, and foreign exchange 
markets are still shallow in most SSA economies. Strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks could 
help reduce inefficiencies and enhance competition. There is also scope for reforms to encourage the 
development  of  more  stock  markets  by  putting  in  place  frameworks  that  will  allow  better  risk 
assessment, reduce market uncertainty, and improve transparency. Broader bond markets will allow 
diversification into longer-term investment instruments—important for long-term investors.  Developing 
forward hedging instruments would also generate some stability in the foreign exchange market by 
reducing forward settlement risks (Ltaifa et al., 2009). 
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